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Innovation ecosystems are built around new 
technologies, ideas, and innovations and their 
supporting actors and structures. However, the 
emergence of ecosystems is constrained by a host of 
institutional, system-level barriers in the existing 
organizational field that inhibit the legitimacy, 
resourcing, and growth of new initiatives. Through an 
empirical study in the Finnish energy sector, we find a 
strong and interdependent set of regulative, normative, 
and cultural–cognitive barriers that restrict the 
emergence of innovation ecosystems with new 
technologies. In particular, we identify a set of barriers 
and related field-sustaining mechanisms. The findings 
offer important implications for the theory and practice 
of innovation ecosystem emergence and related 
system-level barriers. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Innovation ecosystems enable actors, technologies, 
and institutions to come together to create and 
commercialize new products and services (e.g., [33], 
[31], [12]). As open social systems (e.g., [7]), they 
enable dynamic inflows and outflows of resources and 
provide a shared institutional logic for the emergence 
of different types of innovation [46]. However, 
creating new ecosystems is not easy. As new 
innovation ecosystems emerge1, they often disrupt 
existing social, technological, and organizational fields 
and regimes (e.g., [20], [5]). Thus, as new ecosystems 
pursue new trajectories and paths, effectively replacing 
some old ones [3], they often face both deliberate and 
‘passive’ resistance from different types of actors and 
institutions.  
                                                 
1 Emergence describes how complex systems arise out of a set of 
interactions; however, the connection between the actions of 
individual actors and the systemic outcome is uncertain [40]. In 
addition to new ecosystem emergence, we also consider the 
transformation or renewal of a mature ecosystem to be a form of 
emergence, since it involves profound restructuring and other 
organization-level changes [26] that can lead to unpredictable and 
even surprising outcomes at the ecosystem level. 
The literature on innovation and strategy has 
provided considerable evidence of entry barriers, a 
topic that has been discussed since the classic Porterian 
analysis of industry forces [30]. However, the entry 
barrier literature has typically focused on the barriers 
for single actors, rather than on the dynamic 
counterforces that prevent the emergence of whole 
ecosystems. More recently, scholars have begun to 
examine how the entry of new technologies and related 
actors and institutions occurs in various system-level 
settings (e.g., [10], [5], [13], [24]). Further, the 
literature on organizational and institutional fields has 
examined pathways to field change, including the 
entrance of new technologies and actors [49].  
However, a comprehensive understanding of 
barriers and constraining mechanisms is largely absent 
in the innovation ecosystem literature, which has 
focused mostly on how existing businesses build and 
manage their ecosystems (e.g., [33], [47], [31]). This 
literature recognizes that the rise of new ecosystems, 
sudden changes in environmental conditions (e.g., new 
regulations or customer buying behaviors), and 
changes in macroeconomic conditions can threaten 
mature ecosystems [26]. In other words, the research 
on innovation ecosystems sees the wider environment 
as a trigger for the renewal (or death) of these 
ecosystems. Yet, this literature has paid less attention 
to how the broader environment and accompanying 
institutions might create barriers to innovation 
ecosystem emergence and the pre-formation phases of 
innovation ecosystems. In these phases, actors are still 
looking for opportunities to develop new innovations 
for the field, and ecosystem emergence typically 
requires collective action, a jointly adopted vision, and 
actors taking a lead on various issues [6, 29]. By 
contrast, the absence of these conditions acts as a 
barrier to ecosystem emergence. The outcome of this 
phase is unpredictable; however, actors’ choices and 
actions are increasingly influenced by and embedded in 
institutions, and the rules and culture that serve as 
institutional building blocks [35]. Existing innovation 
ecosystem research has not provided overarching 
evidence of the barriers that inhibit the processes (e.g., 
collective action, initiative taking) that lead to 
ecosystem emergence. 
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To address these research gaps and better 
understand the systemic nature of ecosystem 
emergence barriers, we follow [20], who suggest that 
socio-technical transitions can be examined through 
analyses of organizational and institutional fields [14] 
[49]. The institutional literature has long recognized 
that the emergence of new technologies and 
innovations involves complex institutional dynamics 
that require not only technological changes, but also a 
focus on user practices, regulation, infrastructures, and 
symbolic and cultural issues (e.g., [18], [19], [25]). 
These, in turn, might create a strong level of 
institutionalization, which is sustained through an 
interplay with both issue fields, in which powerful 
actors push back against radical developments, and 
market exchange fields, in which transactions are 
dominated by incumbent actors (cf. [49]). Institutional 
lenses have recently been applied to the literature on 
innovation ecosystems. [43] suggest that an 
institutional approach—and, particularly, an 
organizational fields approach—is useful for studying 
the dynamics and boundaries of ecosystems. 
Furthermore, [6] suggest that creating new ecosystems 
requires the establishment of institutional legitimacy 
among relevant stakeholders. 
In the current paper, institutional lenses are adopted 
to examine the diversity and strength of the institutions 
new ecosystem initiatives face and to understand the 
heretofore understudied dynamic counterforces of 
innovation ecosystem emergence. Based on this 
foundation, we propose the following research 
question: What are the barriers that inhibit ecosystem 
emergence, and how are these barriers sustained? To 
answer our research question, we conduct a qualitative 
inquiry with rich empirical evidence from the 
organizational field of the Finnish energy sector. 
Specifically, to examine ecosystem emergence, we 
select the “digitalization” of the energy sector as our 
empirical context. Utilizing an empirical study, we 
identify four ecosystem emergence barriers and related 
field-sustaining mechanisms. We find that the Finnish 
energy sector includes a strong and interdependent set 
of regulative, normative, and cultural–cognitive 
barriers that restrict ecosystem emergence. In 
particular, we build a model that explains how 
regulation and policymaking ambiguity, incumbent 
actor inertia, and cognitive constraints for opportunity 
recognition mutually reinforce one another. Our model 
also explains how the institutional complexity of the 
energy field functions as an overarching barrier. The 
results contribute to the understanding of the pre-
emergence phase of ecosystems and related 
institutional barriers.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the 
conceptual background of innovation ecosystems and 
their emergence, followed by a broader discussion of 
institutional barriers. Second, we describe our 
methodological choices and then draw conclusions 
regarding ecosystem emergence barriers. Finally, we 
discuss the implications for theory and practice and 
suggest future research directions. 
 
2. Conceptual background  
 
2.1. Innovation ecosystem emergence  
 
The concept of innovation ecosystems is widely 
debated (see, e.g., [34], [27], [1], [44]); however, 
consensus is forming around some key features. In 
particular, we follow the recent conceptualization of 
[32, p. 41], who define innovation ecosystems as 
“systems that focus on innovation activities 
(goal/purpose), involve the logic of actor 
interdependence within a particular context (spatial 
dimension) and address the inherent co-evolution of 
actors (temporal dimension).” Innovation ecosystem 
actors typically include private firms that develop new 
technologies, universities and research institutions, and 
complementary firms that provide necessary 
technological components, inputs, and market access 
[3]. 
The existing research on innovation ecosystems has 
examined how such ecosystems are purposefully built 
by leading firms [33], [2], [31], as well as how they 
emerge around broader socio-technical regimes and 
industry-crossing economic developments [13], [34]. 
In this study, we focus particularly on the latter 
context: a broader system-level interdependence of 
actors that engage in innovation activities. Ecosystems 
are built around interdependencies of actors, 
technologies, and institutions [1]; therefore, the 
emergence of an ecosystem is a complex feat in itself. 
However, analyzing actors’ pursuits with respect to 
new ecosystem creation is not sufficient; we must also 
understand the existing and incumbent actors, 
technologies, and institutions that provide the field-
level context within which (potential) emergence 
occurs. 
While ecosystems span several industry boundaries 
[47], [26], their emergence shares some features with 
industry emergence. In examining industry emergence, 
[24] differentiate among three phases. In the first stage, 
a disruption to the existing industrial order triggers a 
second, co-evolutionary stage, which includes four 
sub-processes related to developments in technology, 
markets, activity networks, and industry identity. The 
convergence of these sub-processes leads to the third, 
growth stage and the birth of a new industry. Similarly, 
during their emergence phase, innovation ecosystems 
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first begin to disrupt existing actors, technologies, and 
institutions (e.g., [3]), while simultaneously 
confronting resistance from incumbents. Second, as an 
ecosystem develops, a co-evolution of new and 
existing actors, technologies, and institutions occurs 
(see [3]). Finally, innovation ecosystems enable the 
commercialization of ideas, inventions, and 
technologies, creating new businesses, industries, and 
ecosystems and, thus, integrating the systems’ 
explorative features through exploitation [45].  
In the current study, we are particularly interested 
in the early pre-emergence phase, during which actors 
pushing for new initiatives are still struggling to find 
ways to foster ecosystem creation. To understand this 
phase, we turn our attention to the institutional barriers 
formed at the level of organizational fields (i.e., the 
context in which ecosystem emergence occurs). 
 
2.2 Institutional barriers in organizational 
fields 
 
In general, institutions act as constraints and 
facilitators for innovation and technological 
development [13], [25]. Institutions are broadly seen to 
affect all organizational actions and interactions within 
a particular field (e.g., the energy sector) and to include 
regulative, normative, and cultural–cognitive aspects 
(see, e.g., [19], [25]). 
In the current study, we view the field level as the 
context for analyzing institutional barriers to 
ecosystem emergence. Organizational fields are 
defined as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products” [14 p. 148]. The field level has 
been the key frame for analyses in institutional theory, 
as it explains the relevant contexts for institutional 
phenomena [49]. Recently, institutional theory has also 
begun to look at institutional fields more broadly, 
including fields formed around opinions, politics, 
norms, debates, and organizational arrangements (cf. 
[49]). For ecosystem emergence, examining the full 
variety of institutional phenomena at the field level is 
particularly important, given the co-evolving and 
interdependent nature of ecosystems and their business 
environments (e.g., [1]). 
When analyzing institutional barriers for innovation 
ecosystem emergence, examining legitimacy is 
particularly important. As suggested by [6], new 
ecosystem creation involves building legitimacy across 
various stakeholders, involving regulative issues, 
technological aspects, and cognitive and symbolic 
meanings. This broadly follows the tradition of 
institutional theory, in which legitimacy is divided into 
regulative, normative, and cognitive (see [36], [25], 
[41]). Regulative legitimacy refers to the degree to 
which an organization (or ecosystem) aligns with 
existing processes for rule-setting, monitoring, and 
sanctioning. Normative legitimacy is defined as “a 
degree of congruence or fit between the actions, 
characteristics, and form of the organization and the 
beliefs and cultural values of the broader social 
environment within which it exists” [41, p. 454]. 
Finally, cognitive legitimacy refers to a high degree of 
alignment between an organization’s “taken-for-
granted” expectations and its environment (see, e.g., 
[4]).  
For ecosystem emergence, all three types of 
legitimacy are required; in other words, all three types 
of legitimacy might appear as constraining forces in 
the organizational field. Therefore, analyzing the 
institutional forces and related legitimacy is important 
for understanding not only the context of ecosystem 
emergence, but also the barriers that might prevent 
emergence from happening in the first place. 
 
 
3. Methods  
 
The following sections discuss our methodological 
choices. After elaborating the research strategy and 
how it evolved, we describe the empirical setting of the 
study. Finally, we discuss our approach to the data 
collection and analysis. 
 
 
3.1. Research design and empirical setting 
 
This study originated from a broader research 
project on the emergence of innovation ecosystems that 
initially did not focus on institutional barriers. Rather, 
this focus emerged during the data collection and 
analysis, and we interpreted it as a prominent feature of 
the empirical phenomenon and, thus, a promising 
theme for theorizing. Therefore, we progressively 
focused [28], [38] (see Figure 1) our study on the 
emerging issue of ecosystem emergence barriers and 
formulated our final research question as follows: What 
are the barriers that inhibit innovation ecosystem 
emergence, and how are these barriers sustained? We 
then turned to institutional theory (e.g., [14], [36]), 
which we utilized to sensitize our theorizing. 
Specifically, we focused our study on the level of the 
organizational field [14], [48], [49], initially choosing 
to examine the regulative, normative, and cultural–
cognitive institutional elements [36]. To answer our 
research questions, we relied on an in-depth qualitative 
inquiry, which we consider to be consistent with our 
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research goals and the exploratory nature of the study 
(see [15]).  
The empirical context of this study focuses on the 
energy sector in Finland, which comprises a variety of 
actors ranging from major players to several middle-
sized firms and an increasing number of innovative 
start-ups. The energy sector is an interesting empirical 
context because it is one of the industries least 
disrupted by digitalization both in Finland and globally 
(compared, for instance, to the media and 
telecommunications sectors). Digitalization and related 
business models represent a new socio-technical 
regime [20] in the energy sector, which is currently 
emerging and will eventually replace some older 
business models and practices. As a highly regulated 
and capital-intensive sector, we believe that the energy 
sector is well suited to the study of the institutional 
barriers to ecosystem emergence. For the purposes of 
the current study, the energy sector represents the level 
of analysis of an organizational field in which we 
examine these barriers and related field-sustaining 
processes. Incumbent and established actors in the 
energy sector are interdependent because they must co-
develop the capabilities to respond to this new era. 
Therefore, we perceive the energy sector as a feasible 
empirical context for studying the barriers to 
ecosystem emergence.  
 
3.2. Data collection 
 
Our data collection process comprised semi-
structured interviews. We interviewed 26 key 
informants representing different organizations to 
ensure a variety of viewpoints and, thus, to increase the 
validity of the findings [23]. We first utilized archival 
material to identify the key respondents to interview 
and then used a snowballing technique to identify 
further respondents. We collected our data in 
two phases (see Figure 1). First, we 
interviewed eight experts in the energy sector 
to gain a general understanding of the specific 
field and its current state in terms of 
digitalization. During this phase, we observed 
that there were certain barriers that obstructed 
the emergence of new ecosystems. This led us 
to turn to institutional theory. Accordingly, we 
conceptualized the energy sector as an 
organizational field and formulated our final 
research question. In the second phase, we 
updated our interview guide to include 
questions about the roles of institutions and 
regulations, as well as the roles and activities 
of various actors. We then conducted 18 
additional interviews with key informants 
representing different actors within the organizational 
field. The interviewees represented a wide variety of 
experts, including six leading energy sector academics, 
two research institute representatives, five policy 
makers, ten company representatives, two industry 
association representatives, and one representative of a 
non-governmental organization. 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
  
Our analytical procedure was guided by the 
principles of grounded theory (GT). The GT approach 
provides tools with great potential for analyzing 
processes [8], making it a relevant and well-aligned 
analytical strategy for explaining the dynamic 
phenomenon under examination. In the first phase of 
the data analysis, the first author independently started 
the analysis with initial coding utilizing NVivo. This 
phase involved coding sentences or segments of the 
data depending on their richness. We tried to remain 
open to what our material suggested and used in-vivo 
coding when applicable. The initial codes varied in 
length from a couple of words to full sentences. In the 
second phase of our analysis, the second and third 
authors were actively involved through discussions and 
multiple iterations of the initial codes. At the beginning 
of this phase, the second and third authors examined 
the initial codes separately and provided comments, 
questioning the analytical decisions and helping to 
raise the level of abstraction. We then selected the 
codes that were the most significant, appeared most 
frequently, or made the most analytic sense and started 
to sort and organize them into focused codes (see [8]). 
Our approach to the data analysis followed an iterative 
cycle of inductive patterns involving reflection back 
and forth with theory (cf. [22]) that made it possible to 
draw broad patterns from the data. Additionally, the 
different analytical roles allowed for researcher 
triangulation, yielding a more comprehensive and 
Figure 1. Progressive focusing of our study adapted by [38] 
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heterogeneous set of perspectives, which we 
synthesized during the analysis process. The findings 
presented in the following section are an outcome of 
this analysis process.  
 
4. Findings  
 
Our empirical analysis revealed four main barriers 
to innovation ecosystem emergence: incumbent actor 
inertia, regulation and policymaking ambiguities, 
cognitive constraints for opportunity recognition, and 
institutional complexity. In the following sections, we 
elaborate on each of the four barriers, the mechanisms 
that sustain them, and how they mutually reinforce 
each other. Figure 2 depicts our overall findings 
regarding these institutional counterforces to 




4.1 Incumbent actor inertia  
 
Though we identified some innovative and flexible 
players pushing for energy sector digitalization, we 
found incumbent actors’ inertia to be a prominent 
barrier to new ecosystem emergence and the evolution 
of existing ecosystems. Overall, our informants 
described the organizational field as static and 
conservative. Incumbent actors were perceived as 
hesitant to drive change; their adherence to the past 
business logic and operating principles sustained the 
existing field instead of allowing for renewal. The 
following quotation vividly captures this issue: “They 
want large power plants, and historically, they've 
learned that this is the right thing to do, and maybe it 
has been the right thing to do, and it's okay, but now 
times are changing. But if you are within this group 
and within this bubble, it's very difficult to completely 
revise your thinking and think of the roadmap that: 
How do we go from this point A to the new immaterial 
digital world?” This trend includes energy companies, 
which fear cannibalizing existing investments/business 
and are reluctant to test new business models. Related 
to this issue is the lengthy life cycle of investments in 
the energy sector. For example, power plant 
investments have a life cycle of 35 to 40 years, and 
companies expect to keep the plant running for that 
time. The long economic lifetimes of these kinds of 
investment create a kind of natural inertia among 
incumbent actors.  
In addition, the concentration of influence within 
static and closed networks sustains the bargaining 
power and legitimacy of these actors. The strong in-
group socialization within a relatively small and 
homogeneous group of influential actors and 
individuals leads to the formation of “bubbles” of 
consensus thinking, which result in high normative 
institutional barriers. In fact, the small number of 
influential individuals and their tight interconnections 
when making key decisions concerning, for example, 
energy policy and other decisions that affect the field, 
leads to a lack of outsider perspectives and can result 
in new digital business model initiatives being left on 
the sidelines: “Energy policy will then, basically, be 
done behind closed doors, and [those] who are inside 
the closed doors, they will determine very much the 
contents of the energy policy.” These large incumbents 
have developed a situation similar to a monopoly, 
creating a culture and mindset that lacks innovation 
and customer focus. 
Legacy industry dominance relates to the strong 
presence and influence of current incumbent industries, 
such as the forestry (or “bio-economy”) industry and 
the nuclear industry, among other dominant sectors. 
Our respondents viewed the increased availability of 
bio-based energy in Finland, as well as the access to 
key resources and financial support that historically 
lies within these sectors, as potentially harmful for the 
transformation of the energy sector. The power of these 
sectors stems from their role as major consumers and 
providers of energy, which has encouraged the Finnish 
government to “safeguard” them. As new and nimble 
players willing to innovate in energy efficiency and 
distributed energy production emerge, they find it hard 
to gain equal access to resources and infrastructure.  
 
4.2 Regulation and policymaking ambiguities 
 
The ambiguity in regulation and policymaking is a 
major inhibitor for new investments and broader 
ecosystem initiatives, as it creates uncertainty 
regarding the future direction of the energy policy. 
Though most of our respondents perceived the 
government’s policy targets (e.g., de-carbonizing the 
energy system by 2050) as rather progressive, they 
argued that how these targets will be met is still 
unclear. We found that the slowness of the 
policymaking environment reinforces these 




ambiguities related to the policy vision and the actual 
action plan. Our respondents perceived that energy 
policy always comes a few years behind international 
development and fails to recognize and promote 
advanced policies that could grasp the swift 
technological changes taking place.  
The slowness of policymaking is also related to the 
shortsighted political vision. The transition of political 
regimes (i.e., the parliament) every four years creates 
discontinuity in the policy environment and keeps 
some governments from pushing radical changes and 
making concrete action plans for the future. This 
uncertainty hampers any new ecosystem emergence via 
digitalization or otherwise. 
Finally, geopolitical and economic risks can 
intensify ambiguities in the policymaking environment. 
The dependency on other countries for energy is not 
considered a good pre-condition for progressive 
policymaking, as any attempt to gain energy 
independence could mean that big energy producers 
lose their influence and power, and it is uncertain what 
their reaction would be. Therefore, geopolitical and 
economic risks can slow progress in the policymaking 
environment, which can have a negative impact on 
ecosystem emergence due to uncertainties regarding 
the future.  
 
4.3 Cognitive constraints for opportunity 
recognition 
  
An important barrier to ecosystem emergence 
concerns cognitive constraints to opportunity 
recognition. These constraints involve both new actors 
trying to form new ecosystems and established actors 
attempting to make sense of socio-technical change 
and related opportunities. First, our respondents 
perceived a great deal of uncertainty over market 
opportunities, which makes it difficult to identify 
viable business ventures in the energy sector. In 
particular, the lack of demand for new services and 
products and the low electricity prices discourage 
development and reduce the economic viability of 
investments.  
In addition, the dispersion of necessary capabilities 
and resources creates further constraints for 
collectively recognizing and exploiting opportunities. 
Finnish companies are very small, and they do not 
have the necessary resources to develop new services 
and products for final consumers. There are many 
electricity vendors and distribution companies 
scattered throughout Finland, resulting in a lack of 
interconnection among these spatially and thematically 
dispersed players, making the collective creation of 
opportunities rather challenging.  
Furthermore, regulation that could support the 
development of and/or give incentives for new 
business ventures is lacking. “The policy or legislation 
that could maybe, sometimes, catalyze this kind of 
services is nonexistent. I am not very positive that the 
Finnish energy policy would be that innovative in the 
future, or that it could [support the] creation of new 
services.” The overall lack of policy-driven incentives 
for innovation intensifies the constraints for 
opportunity creation and discovery. The following 
quote vividly describes this situation: “I’ve been in the 
industry for long enough to understand that, wherever 
I put my head, some way or the other, policy will crop 
up behind the corner. When you look at installing new 
renewable capacity or managing flexibility… when you 
have house A and house B wanting to talk to each 
other, policy forbids it. It is not possible. And here, you 
would like to see energy resources being shared so that 
the energy would never leave the neighborhood. It 
would stay in the neighborhood, and you would not 
need the huge cable to the neighborhood because the 
neighborhood could maybe have storage within that 
community. Now, we’re putting in the big cable so that 
we can produce the energy in a centralized plant, in a 
volume-efficient way, burning some sort of fuel, at 
some sort of location.” Finally, the tendency of policy 
decisions to lag behind technological developments 
inhibits the implementability of new services and, thus, 
obstructs the innovation and commercialization 
processes of services providers: “…like, for instance, if 
we would say to a network, ‘We can make sure that 
you can [get] five years’ more life out of your 
substation with this flexibility management service,’ 
the network will go, ‘well, that is all fine, but, in the 
model, I am only reimbursed for ten years of using the 
station. Every year after that, it takes out my benefits 
from my balance sheet because of the regulatory 
model. If I don’t buy a new base station, I’m going to 
lose money.’” This is a representative example of 
policy hindering development and creating major risks 
for energy companies considering adapting to services. 
 
4.4 Institutional complexity 
 
Institutional complexity was perceived as a key 
hindrance for the renewal of the energy sector. The 
energy field is rather complicated, with multiple 
objectives and logics that can be partially conflicting 
and may lack easy solutions. “When researchers make 
calculations and models in Excel, they keep adding 
rows on how the Finnish electricity system should look 
in 2050, so start from scratch… and yet, there is a long 
history of existing infrastructure, so you cannot assume 
us to dismantle the existing infrastructure and start a 
new one from scratch... So, a mere academic 
calculation on how the energy system could be 
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transformed with unlimited resources, it’s a bit too 
theoretical, and it’s not applicable in practice.” Thus, 
the transition to a distributed energy system in which 
energy is provided and consumed using smart, digital 
solutions is an extremely difficult, system-level 
challenge with system-level renewal requirements. For 
example, there are objectives for climate policy both at 
the EU level and nationally. The primary means to 
achieve these goals is through reduced emissions, 
investments in renewable energy, and energy 
efficiency. However, these have become separate 
objectives, which complicates things even further. For 
example, managing emissions alone does not 
necessarily provide sufficient incentive to change the 
energy system.  
The complex regulatory environment can slow 
decision-making and, thus, development. The energy 
sector is one of the most central industries in Finnish 
society, which increases the role of authorities. 
Compared to other industries, authorities highly 
influence the business environment in the energy 
sector. The multiple authorities and ministries involved 
in decision-making also complicates the regulatory 
environment, creating unnecessary bureaucracy and 
decelerating investments. 
 
4.5 Synthesis: Institutional counterforces to 
innovation ecosystem emergence 
 
Our analysis suggests the mutual reinforcement of 
regulation, policymaking ambiguities, the inertia of 
incumbent actors, and cognitive constraints for 
opportunity recognition inhibit innovation ecosystem 
emergence. In addition, institutional complexity 
functions as an overarching barrier that further sustains 
the rigidity of incumbent actors and policymakers and 
creates additional cognitive constraints for opportunity 
recognition.  
As described in Error! Reference source not 
found., incumbent actors’ unwillingness to change due 
to their path-dependent histories (i.e., “incumbent actor 
inertia”) feeds into and reinforces the cognitive 
constraints for opportunity recognition. Specifically, 
taken-for-granted assumptions, the legitimacy of 
current business logics [25], [41], and the stabilizing 
influence of shared norms [36] make it difficult for 
incumbent actors to identify opportunities for new 
business. “We have such a strong tradition in that 
area, so if you build a pulp mill and you can sell the 
pulp for the global markets, then you are in a position 
where this energy comes from almost nothing invested. 
So, it’s not expensive at all in Finland.” On the other 
hand, cognitive constraints for opportunity recognition 
can also reinforce incumbent firms’ inability to 
overcome organizational inertia. For instance, due to 
market uncertainties related to the low electricity prices 
and a lack of demand, energy companies do not see the 
opportunity to develop products and services for 
customers to support, for example, energy efficiency or 
demand response. Thus, as there is little motivation to 
change, the inertia of energy companies increases; they 
do not respond to the changing environment, but 
instead continue with previously learned practices (see 
also [21], [16], [42]). 
The ambiguities in the policy environment create 
further cognitive constraints for opportunity 
recognition. First, the discontinuity between political 
regimes makes it difficult for energy companies to 
know which investments are wise and sustainable. In 
addition, the absence of explicit intentions and 
decisions concerning concrete measures, as perceived 
by many of our respondents, does not send the 
necessary policy signals about where the best 
opportunities lie. Finally, the traditional view in the 
energy sector that energy production must occur on a 
large scale has led to policies focusing on very large 
centralized energy production. These policies have 
failed to promote distributed, renewable energy 
generation, which is where new energy sector 
ecosystems are emerging. However, renewables have 
gradually gained a very large market share and do not 
require large centralized units. Therefore, as policy 
ambiguities based on the current policy environment 
increase, it is unclear how actors in the energy sector 
should make use of common investments in networks 
or what the nature of the services should be. 
Prior literature has highlighted the central role of 
the wider environment in fostering the acceptance of 
innovation and supporting and sustaining changes once 
they occur [36]. However, according to our findings, 
the complexity of this wider environment can create an 
additional systemic barrier that actually sustains the 
full range of cognitive, normative, and regulative 
constraining forces. First, with respect to incumbent 
actor inertia and the cognitive constraints on 
opportunity recognition, many of the actors in the 
energy sector lack an overall vision or understanding 
of what is required for a system-level transition. 
Therefore, as “this kind of big picture, it is missing,” 
incumbent actors become unable to overcome their 
organizational inertia and drive change in the existing 
field. For smaller actors with less bargaining power, 
the field’s complexity makes it challenging to 
recognize and tap into opportunities because “it takes 
quite a lot of more complex business models and 
networks.” Second, the complexity of the overall 
energy field also reinforces the ambiguities in 
policymaking. In particular, as described in the 
previous sections, policymakers must consider multiple 
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objectives and sometimes conflicting factors in their 
decision-making. Hence, there is no “quick fix where 
you put out some easy solution,” especially when “as 
regulators, we will still have to be equal and 
transparent and not discriminate rules in the future for 
these guys who might not be able to participate in the 
market.” 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our study has examined ecosystem emergence 
barriers in the energy sector. As summarized in Figure 
1, we found four system-level barriers: incumbent 
actor inertia, regulation and policymaking ambiguities, 
cognitive constraints for opportunity recognition, and 
institutional complexity. These interlinked barriers 
sustain the existing status quo and prevent emerging 
and established actors from creating new ecosystems in 
the field. A better understanding of these barriers 
would enable focal actors driving new ecosystem 
initiatives to identify potential system-level hindrances 
and find solutions that potentially overcome some of 
these barriers. The study also informs policymakers on 
the difficulties in generating new ecosystems in an 
established and institutionalized field. The study 
contributes to several literature streams, which we 
discuss below. Practical and policy implications, as 
well as limitations and future research directions, are 
then discussed. 
 
5.1 Theoretical contributions 
 
First, our study contributes to the little-researched 
avenue of ecosystem emergence and the pre-
emergence phase of ecosystems. As discussed by [45], 
scholars tend to take the existence of an ecosystem for 
granted, meaning that not enough attention has been 
paid to the earlier stages of an ecosystem (i.e., its 
emergence). While some studies have discussed how 
individual actors can deliberately build innovation 
ecosystems (e.g., [33], [47], [31]), our study shows that 
the “natural” emergence of broader innovation 
ecosystems involves a much more multifaceted set of 
issues. Thus, it is important to critically examine the 
broader institutional environment and particular 
organizational fields (e.g., the energy sector) when 
analyzing how the grassroots emergence of innovation 
ecosystems is constrained. Our empirical findings 
identify several institutional counterforces that together 
act as system-level barriers. Such understanding is 
crucial for ecosystem scholars, as it provides a more 
holistic outlook than the classic entry barriers 
literature. Furthermore, while our findings mostly 
relate to the emergence barriers of innovation 
ecosystems, they might also support a deeper 
understanding of the barriers to broader ecosystem 
renewal and transformation, though this is a question 
for further research to elaborate. 
 Second, our study contributes to the research 
on institutional barriers to new technology (e.g., [18] 
[19], [20], [13], [25]), focusing particularly on the field 
level [14], [48]. Our study shows that organizational 
fields involve a variety of field-sustaining mechanisms 
that mutually reinforce one another over time. 
Interestingly, our findings on “regulation and 
policymaking ambiguity,” “incumbent actor inertia,” 
and “cognitive constraints for opportunity recognition” 
are closely linked to the respective dimensions of 
regulative, normative, and cognitive legitimacy that are 
used in institutional theory to explain the emergence of 
new technology. Therefore, different dimensions of 
legitimacy seem to be an important pre-condition for 
ecosystem emergence. However, our findings 
complement these existing perspectives in the 
institutional literature by providing a more overarching 
view of the dynamic and interlinked barriers to 
ecosystem emergence (see Figure 1). These findings 
contribute to the calls for more research to understand 
field changes and related restraining forces (cf. [49]). 
Thus, our study informs the stream of research on how 
field change is inhibited by incumbents and 
“institutional elites” with the power to manage and 
constrain change. 
 
5.2 Practical and policy implications  
 
Our results provide practical insights for actors 
seeking to understand field-level change and “system-
level” innovations. Our study first reveals the systemic 
interdependence and consequent inertia hampering the 
adoption of digitalization and the exploration of 
business models. The heavy and very long investment 
cycles of traditional energy sources make 
interdependent key actors hesitant to pursue any 
disruptive forces. Compared to other traditional 
industries, it is more likely that the new digital 
business models would come from outside rather than 
inside the traditional industry. Yet, due to the energy 
industry’s systemic nature, and without the support of 
incumbent players, the emergence of innovation 
ecosystems is difficult, if not impossible. However, the 
incumbent players lack the capabilities and the mindset 
required to build customer-driven digital services. This 
is a vicious circle that is further hampered by the lack 
of active policies and regulation supporting industry 
renewal.  
With the advent of new technologies, we expect 
similar challenges to apply across different industries. 
Indeed, most major innovations require changing 
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and/or challenging existing institutions (regulative, 
normative, cognitive); therefore, we expect that our 
results will also apply to other contexts. With respect 
to the energy sector, it seems that the movement 
toward digitalization and related renewal is only 
possible if influential individuals and key stakeholders 
can join forces for collective strategic action. A joint 
understanding and shared vision of the energy sector 
transition is needed, as is the ability to influence the 
policymaking, regulation, and infrastructures required 
for research, development, and piloting [17]. However, 
this transition also requires new players. Innovation 
rarely comes from industry incumbents [9], and this 
seems to be the prevailing situation in the Finnish 
energy sector.  
 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
directions  
 
This study has context-specific and 
generalizability-related limitations inherent to any 
exploratory qualitative study, including sector and 
country specificity. Our findings concerning barriers 
might be most applicable to other investment-intensive 
industries with strong state regulation. However, we 
expect that the results provide a useful overview of the 
institutional complexities and field-sustaining 
mechanisms that inhibit ecosystem emergence.  
Based on the findings, and acknowledging the 
limitations, our study provides several avenues for 
future research. Researchers could focus on different 
types of processes through which emergence barriers 
are dissolved, such as institutional work, cooperative 
interactions between incumbents and entrants [2], and 
relevant market mechanisms [13]. For instance, it 
would be interesting to study how individual actors 
(private or public) can help address and resolve 
ecosystem emergence barriers by reducing uncertainty, 
generating collective vision, and creating various types 
of incentives to join a new ecosystem [see also 6].  In 
this regard, research integrating social movements, 
organization theory [15] and institutional 
entrepreneurship could be potentially useful lenses for 
examining the emergence of new ecosystems [11]. 
Finally, it would be interesting to examine institutional 
complexity (a major barrier to emergence) in more 
depth. For instance, some institutional scholars have 
suggested that institutional complexity is also a 
facilitator of new initiatives [39], [37]. This double 
role of complexity as both a barrier and an enabler is a 
fascinating direction for future research in innovation 
ecosystem emergence. 
 
6. References  
    
[1] L. Aarikka-Stenroos and P. Ritala, “Network 
management in the era of ecosystems: Systematic review and 
management framework,” Industrial Marketing 
Management, vol. 67, pp. 23-36, 2017. 
[2] R. Adner and R. Kapoor, “Value creation in innovation 
ecosystems: How the structure of technological 
interdependence affects firm performance in new technology 
generations,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 31, pp. 
306-33, 2010.  
[3] R. Adner and R. Kapoor, “Innovation ecosystems and the 
pace of substitution: Re‐examining technology S‐curves,” 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 37, pp. 625-48, 2016. 
[4] H. E. Aldrich and C. M. Fiol, “Fools rush in? The 
institutional context of industry creation,” Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 645-70, 1994. 
[5] S. S. Ansari, R. Garud, and A.  Kumaraswamy, “The 
disruptor's dilemma: TiVo and the US television ecosystem,”  
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 37, pp. 1829-53, 2016. 
[6] E. Autio and L. Thomas, “Tilting the playing field: 
Towards an endogenous strategic action theory of ecosystem 
creation,” in Open Innovation, Innovation Ecosystems, and 
Entrepreneurship: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, S. 
Nambisan, Ed. New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing, 
2016. 
[7] E. Autio and L. Thomas, “Innovation ecosystems: 
Implications for innovation management,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Innovation Management, M. Dodgson, N. 
Philips, & D. M. Gann, Eds. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016, pp. 204-28.  
[8] K. Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory. London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014. 
[9] C. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.   
[10] B. Clarysse, M. Wright, J. Bruneel, and A. Mahajan, 
“Creating value in ecosystems: Crossing the chasm between 
knowledge and business ecosystems,” Research Policy, vol. 
43, pp. 1164-76, 2014. 
[11] M. T. Dacin, J. Goldstein, and W. R. Scott, “Institutional 
theory and institutional change: Introduction to the special 
forum,” Academy of Management Journal, vol. 45, pp. 45-
57, 2002.  
[12] B. Dattée, O. Alexy, and E. Autio, “Maneuvering in 
poor visibility: How firms play the ecosystem game when 
uncertainty is high,” Academy of Management Journal, vol. 
61, no. 2, pp. 466-98, 2018.  
[13] M. Dijk, P. Wells, and R. Kemp, “Will the momentum 
of the electric car last? Testing an hypothesis on disruptive 
innovation,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
vol. 105, pp. 77-88, April 2016.  
[14] P. J. DiMaggio and W. W. Powell, “The iron cage 
revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality 
in organizational fields,” American Sociological Review, vol. 
48, pp. 147-60, 1983.  
[15] A. Dubois and L. E. Gadde, “Systematic combining: An 
abductive approach to case research,” Journal of Business 
Research, vol. 55, no. 7, 2002, pp. 553-60. 
[16] J. Dutton and S. Jackson, “Categorizing strategic issues: 
Links to organizational action,” Academy of Management 
Review, vol. 12, pp. 76-90, 1987. 
Page 6365
  
[17] N. Fliegstein and D. McAdam, “Toward a general 
theory of strategic action fields,” Sociological Theory, vol. 
29, pp. 1-26, 2011.  
[18] F. W. Geels, “Technological transitions as evolutionary 
reconfiguration processes: A multi-level perspective and a 
case-study,” Research Policy, vol. 31, pp. 1257-74, 2002. 
[19] F. W. Geels, “From sectoral systems of innovation to 
socio-technical systems: Insights about dynamics and change 
from sociology and institutional theory,” Research Policy, 
vol. 33, pp. 897-920, 2004. 
[20] F. W. Geels and J. Schot, “Typology of sociotechnical 
transition pathways,” Research Policy, vol. 36, pp. 399-417, 
2007.  
[21] C. G. Gilbert, “Unbundling the structure of inertia: 
resource versus routine rigidity,” Academy of Management 
Journal, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 741-63, 2005. 
[22] B. G. Glaser and A. L Strauss, Discovery of Grounded 
Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: 
Aldine, 1967. 
[23] B. R. Golden, “Research notes. The past is the past—Or 
is it? The use of retrospective accounts as indicators of past 
strategy,” Academy of Management Journal, vol. 35, no. 4, 
pp. 848-60, 1992.  
[24] R. Gustafsson, M. Jääskeläinen, M. Maula, and J. 
Uotila, “Emergence of industries: A review and future 
directions,” International Journal of Management Reviews, 
vol. 18, pp. 28-50, 2016.  
[25] J. Markard, S. Wirth, and B. Truffer, “Institutional 
dynamics and technology legitimacy—A framework and a 
case study on biogas technology,” Research Policy, vol. 45, 
pp. 330-44, 2016.  
[26] J. F. Moore, “Predators and prey: A new ecology of 
competition,” Harvard Business Review, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 
75-86, 1993. 
[27] D. S. Oh, F. Phillips, S. Park, and E. Lee, “Innovation 
ecosystems: A critical examination,” Technovation, vol. 54, 
pp. 1-6, 2016.  
[28] M. Parlett and D. Hamilton, “Evaluation as illumination: 
A new approach to the study of innovatory programs,” 
Edinburgh: Centre for Research in the Educational Sciences, 
University of Edinburgh, 1972. 
[29] A. Pellinen, P. Ritala, K. Järvi, and L. M. Sainio, 
“Taking initiative in market creation—A business ecosystem 
actor perspective,” International Journal of Business 
Environment, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 140-58, 2012. 
[30] M. E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and 
Sustaining Superior Performance, New York: Free Press, 
1985. 
[31] P. Ritala, V. Agouridas, D. Assimakopoulos, and O. 
Gies, “Value creation and capture mechanisms in innovation 
ecosystems: A comparative case study,” International 
Journal of Technology Management, vol. 63, pp. 244-67, 
2013.  
[32] P. Ritala and A. Almpanopoulou, “In defense of 'eco' in 
innovation ecosystem,” Technovation, vol. 60, pp. 39-42, 
2017.  
[33] R. Rohrbeck, K. Hölzle, and G. H. Gemünden, 
“Opening up for competitive advantage—How Deutsche 
Telekom creates an open innovation ecosystem,” R&D 
Management, vol. 39, pp. 420-30, 2009.  
[34] C. G. Sandström, “The non-disruptive emergence of an 
ecosystem for 3D printing—Insights from the hearing aid 
industry's transition 1989–2008,” Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, vol. 102, pp. 160-8, 2016. 
[35] G. Schreyögg and J. Sydow, “Organizational path 
dependence: A process view,” Organization Studies, vol. 32, 
no. 3, pp. 321-35, 2011. 
[36] W. R. Scott, Institutions and organizations, 4th ed. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014. 
[37] J. Siltaloppi, K. Koskela-Huotari, and S. L. Vargo, 
“Institutional complexity as a driver for innovation in service 
ecosystems,” Service Science, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 333-43, 2016. 
[38] R. R. Sinkovics and E. A. Alfoldi, “Progressive focusing 
and trustworthiness in qualitative research—The enabling 
role of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS),” Management International Review, vol. 52, pp. 
817-45, 2012. 
[39] M. Smets and P. Jarzabkowski, “Reconstructing 
institutional complexity in practice: A relational model of 
institutional work and complexity,” Human Relations, vol.  
66, no. 10, pp. 1279-1309, 2013. 
[40] M. Y. Smith and R. Stacey, “Governance and 
cooperative networks: An adaptive systems perspective,” 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 54, no. 1, 
pp. 79-94, 1997. 
[41] R. Suddaby, A. Bitektine, and P. Haack, “Legitimacy,” 
Academy of Management Annals, vol. 11, pp. 451-78, 2017. 
[42] B. M. Staw, L. Sandelands, and J. Dutton, “Threat 
rigidity effects in organizational behavior,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, vol. 26, pp. 501-24, 1981. 
[43] L. D. Thomas and E. Autio, “The fifth facet: The 
ecosystem as an organizational field,” Academy of 
Management Proceedings, p. 10306, 2014.  
[44] M. Tsujimoto, Y. Kajikawa, J. Tomita, and Y. 
Matsumoto, “A review of the ecosystem concept—Towards 
coherent ecosystem design,” Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 2017. [Online]. Available doi: 
10.1016/j.techfore.2017.06.032 
[45] K. Valkokari, “Business, innovation, and knowledge 
ecosystems: How they differ and how to survive and thrive 
within them,” Technology Innovation Management Review, 
vol. 5, pp. 17-24, 2015.  
[46] S. L. Vargo, H. Wieland, and M. A. Akaka, “Innovation 
through institutionalization: A service ecosystems 
perspective,” Industrial Marketing Management, vol. 44, 63-
72, 2015. 
[47] P. J. Williamson and A. De Meyer, “Ecosystem 
advantage,” California Management Review, vol. 55, pp. 24-
46, 2012.  
[48] M. Wooten and A. J. Hoffman, “Organizational fields: 
Past, present and future,” in The Sage Handbook of 
Organisational Institutionalism, R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. 
Sahlin, and R. Suddaby, Eds. London: Sage, 2008, p. 130-
147. 
[49] C. Zietsma, P. Groenewegen, D. M. Logue, and C. B. 
Hinings, “Field or fields? Building the scaffolding for 
cumulation of research on institutional fields,” Academy of 
Management Annals, vol. 11, pp. 391-450, 2017.  
 
Page 6366
